Top 5 Judgment of October Month

Author-Vasundhara Kaushik, [Allahabad University]

1. Arcelor Mittal India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Satish Kumar Gupta

In the decision in Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the Supreme Court has set out the genuinely necessary law including section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

The core of the issue is that there was a bidding war for the indebted company Essar Steel India Limited between Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited and Numetal Limited. At the resolution stage, the resolution proficient precluded both Arcelor Mittal and Numetal. ArcelorMittal was found to have been the advertiser or practiced command more than two companies, Uttam Galva Steels Limited and KSS Petron Limited, which owed contribution to banks and monetary institutions that stay unpaid. On account of Numetal, it was discovered that the organization was built up ahead of the pack up to the resolutions of Essar Steel and that it was basically controlled by Rewant Ruia, who is the child of Ravi Ruia (one of the advertisers of Essar Steel). The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) certified the resolution expert’s preclusion of the two bidders. On request, be that as it may, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) concurred with Arcelor Mittal’s exclusion, however arrived at an alternate end in regards to Numetal on the grounds that Rewant Ruia had by then stripped his Numetal advantages for VTB, a Russian element. It was against this decision that Arcelor Mittal moved toward the Supreme Court.

Section 29A was embedded in the Code with effect from 23 November 2017 and has been the topic of no less than two rounds of alterations and amendments from there on. The arrangement makes ineligible a few classifications of people for bidding for companies and their business that are the topic of indebtedness under the Code. Not only has it been a questionable section but it also has been loaded with impressive multifaceted nature that the Court was called upon to unload.

In its intricate decision that tends to address different parts of section 29A and stretches out to more extensive territories of the law, for example, lifting the corporate cover (veil) and characterizing corporate control, the Supreme Court found that the two bidders were trapped inside the limits of the preclusion in the section. Exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court requested that the two bidders need to clear the levy owed in regard of different organizations forming some portion of their group on the off chance that they wish to submit crisp fresh resolution plans, which they should do within about fourteen days.

2. Sushil Kumar Agrawal Vs Meenakshi Sadhu & othrs

Giving a purposive elucidation to Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963,the Supreme Court has held that the said area does not banish an engineer from looking for particular execution of improvement understanding against the proprietor of the correct property. This was set around by the bench of Justice A M Khanwilkar and Justice D Y Chandrachud in Sushil Kumar Agarwal versus Meenakshi Sadhu and others.

The appealing party before the Supreme Court was an engineer, who had gone into a development agreement with the respondent to make developments in the respondent’s plot. On disputes emerging between them, the appealing party initiated a suit for a particular execution of the understanding. Be that as it may, the suit was expelled by the preliminary court on ground that Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act banished such suit. The Calcutta High Court maintained the rejection in request, and the issue achieved the Supreme at the occurrence of the developer. The Court saw that agreements for development are not normally authorized by Court, with the exception of in remarkable circumstances.

According to Section 14(3)(c), the court will arrange particular execution of a consent to manufacture if:

(a) the building work is adequately characterized by the agreement, for instance by reference to itemized plans;

(b) the offended party has a considerable enthusiasm for the execution of the agreement of such a nature, to the point that harms would not repay him for the litigant’s inability to fabricate; and

(c) the respondent is in control of the land so the offended party can’t utilize someone else to work without submitting a trespass.

Both the preliminary court and High Court held that Section 14(3)(c)(iii) particularly made reference to respondent being in control of land as a precondition to arrange particular execution. Be that as it may, in the present case, the litigant was the proprietor of the land the respondent was simply the proprietor of the land, who was at that point under lock and key. Thus, it was held by the preliminary court and in addition the High Court that the arrangement did not mull over an engineer looking for a particular execution of the agreement as an offended party.

3. S. Sarojini Amma Vs. Velayudhan Pillai Sreekumar

The Appellant in the case assailed High Court’s judgment, whereby the High Court passed judgment in favour of the respondent. In the case respondent was the nephew of appellant and in the expectation that the respondent will look after the appellant and her husband and also for some consideration, the appellant executed a purported gift deed in favour of the respondent. The gift deed clearly stated that the gift would take effect after the death of the appellant and her husband. However, later the appellant executed the deed of cancellation, cancelling the gift deed. Aggrieved by the cancellation of gift deed, the respondent filed suit for declaration that the cancellation of deed executed by the appellant was null and void. In appeal, the appellant has contended that the document styled as gift deed was to come into effect only after the death of the appellant and her husband.

The Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, passed a decision for the Appellant in perspective of the accompanying perceptions made by the Bench for the case:

• That Gift intends to transfer certain current movable or immovable property deliberately (voluntarily) and without consideration by one individual called the contributor(donor) to another called the donee and acknowledged by or for the benefit of the donee as held by the Supreme Court in Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker versus Pranivandas.
• That the execution of a registered gift deed, acknowledgment of the gift and conveyance of the property together make the gift complete. From there on, the contributor is stripped of his title and the donee ends up outright proprietor of the property.
• That a contingent blessing with no presentation of acknowledgment and no proof in verification of acknowledgment, where ownership stays with the giver as long as he is alive, does not wind up total amid lifetime of the contributor. At the point when a blessing is fragmented and title stays with the contributor the deed of gift may be dropped.      
• That there is no provision in law that proprietorship in property can’t be gifted without exchange of ownership of such property. Be that as it may, the conditions point of reference of a gift as characterized in Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act must be fulfilled.
• That a gift is transfer of property without consideration. In addition, a contingent gift just only complete becomes on compliance of the conditions in the deed.

In perspective of the previously mentioned perceptions, the Supreme Court for the situation held that there was no finished endowment of the property being referred to by the appealing party to the respondent and the litigant was inside her privilege in dropping the deed.

4. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Vs. Pankaj Chaudhary & Ors

The Supreme Court on Tuesday observed that a lady has a “right to decline to submit herself to sex to anybody” regardless of whether she is habituated to sexual intercourse and that no surmising on her “character” is reasonable from that, while putting aside a Delhi High Court decision that cleared four men of rape in a 1997 case.

“Even in cases where there is some material to show that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse, no inference like the victim being a woman of ‘loose moral character’ is permissible to be drawn from that circumstance alone,” said a bench of justices R Banumathi and Indira Banerjee.

The bench likewise ordered an investigation against the cops who inquired the case. “Notwithstanding expecting that the prosecutrix was of easy virtue, she has a privilege to decline to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anybody,” said the court, revealed Bar and Bench.

The case was that the blamed (accused) entered the jhuggi of the complainant at Shaheed Bhagat Singh Jhuggi Camp, Katwaria Sarai in Delhi on 28 July 1997 and raped her. Charges were then confined against the accused under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC to which they argued not liable. The accused in their statement under Section 313 CrPC had before expressed that the complainant was of awful character and she was enjoying prostitution and in this way said they were dishonestly embroiled in the rape case. They additionally told the court that a protestation was held up by them against her however nothing was produced under the watchful eye of the court. The preliminary court indicted them considering the proof of the complainant. In any case, the accused moved to the Delhi High Court, where they displayed the supposed dissensions that were made against the prosecutrix, amid the hearing.

The high court at that point saw that the preliminary court committed an error in saying that the blamed (accused) failed to demonstrate the making of past grievances against the complainant. The court then cleared the blamed for rape. The bench saw that the high court was wrong in thinking about those dissensions created at the season of contentions in the interest. Alluding or referring to the judgment in State of Maharashtra and Another versus Madhurkar Narayan Mardikar, the bench said that the proof of a lady can’t be expelled simply because she is a lady of easy virtues. The bench at that point expressed that the preliminary court judgment can be re-established on the sole declaration of the prosecutrix in the event that it motivates certainty, and certified the sentence of 10 years imposed on the accused by the preliminary court.

5. SK. Tamisuddin v. Joy Joseph Creado & Anr.

Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act- In this ongoing case, the Supreme Court repeated the settled position of law that a complaint recorded by the power of lawyer would be viable in law.

In the present case, a compliant under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 was filed by one-Sairabee through her Special Power of Attorney Holder. Be that as it may, Sairabee died while the preliminary was in progress or was ongoing. The appealing party after the demise of Sairabee filed an application under the steady gaze of the learned preliminary Court to proceed with the arraignment as her legitimate heir.

The said application was quashed by the High Court on the ground that the inception of protestation by the Special Power of Attorney of Sairabee was invalid and that the continuation of the procedures after the demise of Sairabee by the said Power of Attorney would not be permissible. Oppressed by the reviled request of High Court, the Appellant moved toward the Supreme Court.

The Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while settling on reference to its decision on account of A.C. Narayanan versus Province of Maharashtra and Another, wherein the Apex Court held that a dissension filed by the power of lawyer would be viable in law.

The Supreme Court Bench additionally noticed that after the demise of Sairabee, the application filed by the appealing party was to proceed with the criminal indictment as the legitimate heir of the expired Sairabee.